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LIVING AS IF GOD EXISTS: 
LOOKING FOR A COMMON GROUND 
IN TIMES OF RADICAL PLURALISM
PETER JONKERS
Tilburg University
Abstract: This paper offers some comments on some metaphysical and 
epistemological claims of (critical) theological realism from the perspective 
of continental philosophy of religion, thereby taking the work of Soskice and 
Hick as paradigmatic for this kind of philosophical theology. The first comment 
regards the fact that theological realism considers religious and theological 
propositions as ways to depict or represent reality, and hence aims to bring them 
as much as possible in line with scientific ones. Some contemporary French 
philosophers (Ricoeur, Lévinas, and Marion) criticize such a  representing, 
depicting knowledge of God, because it encapsulates the divine reality in 
mundane, specifically scientific categories. Eventually, theological realism runs 
the risk of annihilating God’s radical transcendence and reducing religion to 
an alternative scientific theory. The second comment tries to explore whether 
one can affirm God’s reality from a  practical perspective, as a  postulate of 
reason, and whether such an approach could serve as a  common ground for 
religious and secular (practical) ways of life in times of radical pluralism. This 
comment begins by investigating the regulative character of Kant’s idea of God 
as the highest idea of reason, which not only orientates our theoretical enquiries, 
but also our moral actions. Although this idea is only a  heuristic fiction for 
theoretical reason, God’s existence has to be affirmed on practical grounds, as 
a symbolic reality that gives orientation to people’s lives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate between the proponents of theological realism and those of 
theological anti-realism has been almost exclusively the affair of analytic 
philosophy of religion. Unfortunately, contemporary continental 
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philosophy of religion has hardly paid attention to this debate, and hence 
has failed to enter into a  fruitful dialogue with analytic philosophy of 
religion on this issue. In my view, one of the reasons for this neglect 
is that the core of the debate about (theological) (anti)realism has 
largely been perceived as a  metaphysical one. Because contemporary 
continental philosophy predominantly concentrates on a deconstruction 
of metaphysics, it feels entitled to leave this debate aside. Another reason 
is that not only most continental, but also some analytic philosophers of 
religion, such as D.Z. Phillips, consider religion as primarily as giving 
orientation to life, rather than as a set of theoretical propositions about 
natural and supernatural states of affairs, which seems to be the focus 
of most proponents of theological (anti)realism.1 Finally, continental 
philosophy is hardly interested in the kind of epistemological issues that 
analytic philosophy of religion is dealing with. If continental philosophy 
pays any attention at all to these kinds of questions, it does so in order 
to highlight the (problematic) consequences of religious truth claims in 
a pluralistic society.
In this paper I want to offer a modest contribution to a dialogue between 
analytic and continental philosophy of religion, by commenting on some 
underlying assumptions of theological realism from the perspective of 
continental philosophy of religion. The first comment regards the fact 
that theological realism considers religious and theological propositions 
as ways to depict reality, and hence aims to bring them as much as 
possible in line with scientific ones. More specifically, I  will examine 
if an  interpretation of God’s reality on the basis of this metaphysical 
paradigm is tenable religiously. In this section I take Janet Soskice’s work 
on theological realism as my point of departure. The second comment 
tries to explore whether a different kind of theological realism could be 
an option. In particular, I want to examine what happens to God’s reality 
if one starts from the life-orienting dimension of religion rather than 
on focusing on His existence from a theoretical perspective. Moreover, 
I want to investigate whether such an approach could serve as a common 
ground in times of radical pluralism. In this section, I take John Hick’s 
work as my point of departure.
1 In support of this distinction between a  theoretical and a  practical approach of 
religion, see Niek Brunsveld, The Many Faces of Religious Truth: Developing Hilary 
Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism into an Alternative for Religious Realism and Antirealism 
(Utrecht: Utrecht University, 2012), pp.  11f. Brunsveld distinguishes between the 
supernatural, the natural, and the life-orienting aspects of religion.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF DEPICTING GOD’S REALITY
A  fundamental epistemological assumption of theological realism is 
that religious or theological language is capable of depicting the divine 
reality, and hence, of offering a representing knowledge of this reality. 
Philosophical realism in general can be defined as holding that ‘the 
historicity of linguistic understanding and the contextuality of meaning 
do not at all exclude that there can be criteria of meaning, truth and 
rationality that surpass contextuality and are related to reality. [...] 
Realist theories want to keep the claim on a possible objectivity of the 
human activity of meaning giving and proposition making, which 
goes beyond purely intersubjective or parochial convictions.’2 As Janet 
Soskice has pointed out, a common claim of all kinds of philosophical 
realism is that our language somehow refers to reality, more specifically 
that science depicts reality by making use of models and metaphors.3 
Whereas in naïve realism, ‘models are viewed as providing a description 
of how things are in themselves, and science is seen as a  process of 
making immediate the hitherto invisible structures of the world’,4 critical 
realism considers these models ‘not as logical ciphers but as terms which 
putatively refer to possible real entities, relations, and states of affairs’.5 
In sum, critical realism does not see the models and metaphors, used by 
scientific explanation, as heuristic fictions; instead, it regards scientific 
explanation as reality depicting. This does not mean that critical 
realism claims that science mirrors the world; rather it sees scientific 
terms ‘as representing reality without claiming to be representationally 
privileged’.6 This shows that Soskice makes a  distinction between the 
reality depicting or referential intention of all scientific explanation and 
the figurative character of the actual descriptions that scientific models 
and metaphors provide of reality, implying that none of them has 
a privilege in representing reality.
Given the fact that metaphors not only play an  important role in 
scientific theories, but are even more predominant in the domain of 
2 Hans-Peter Großhans, Theologischer Realismus: Ein sprachphilosophischer Beitrag zu 
einer theologischen Sprachlehre (Tübingen: Mohr, 1996), p. 6.
3 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), pp. 118 and 136.
4 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p. 118.
5 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p.  120. See Hans-Peter 
Großhans, Theologischer Realismus, pp. 12f.
6 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p. 132.
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religion and theology, Soskice applies the above distinction to religion 
and theology: they claim, just like science, to depict reality without 
having the pretension of giving a definitive and adequate description of 
the divine reality ‘as it is’. She considers Anselm’s famous formula in the 
Proslogion, ‘God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived’, 
as an  excellent example of designating what a  God must be without 
describing God.7 Analogous to philosophical realism, theological 
realism can metaphysically speaking be defined as ‘the view that there 
is a  transcendent divine reality independent at least in part of human 
thought, action and attitudes’.8 On an epistemological level, theological 
realism holds that our religious and theological language has the 
intention and is in principle able to depict this reality. Hence, religious 
language should not be taken only as expressing an emotive meaning, 
but also as having a reference to a human-independent reality, that can 
in principle be represented by human language. In sum, according to 
critical theological realism, ‘the theist can reasonably take his talk of 
God, bound as it is within a wheel of images, as being reality depicting, 
while at the same time acknowledging its inadequacy as description.’9
In my view, Soskice’s distinction between referring to God and 
defining or describing Him presents a major contribution to theological 
realism, in particular because it does justice to the insights of negative 
theology when we speak about God’s reality: ‘In our stammering after 
a transcendent God we must speak, for the most part, metaphorically or 
not at all.’10 However, from the perspective of contemporary continental 
philosophy, a major problem of Soskice’s approach is that she narrows 
down our religious and theological referring to God’s reality to depicting 
or representing him. This enables her to link the kind of explanation 
of the world that religion and theology offer closely to a  scientific 
explanation. But this goes at a considerable cost, namely that of turning 
religion and theology into the same kind of objectifying language and 
knowledge as science. The fact that theological realism aims to represent 
God raises the question whether this does not lead to encapsulating 
7 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p. 138.
8 Hans-Peter Großhans, Theologischer Realismus, p. 1. In a  similar vein, John Hick 
defines religious realism as ‘the view that the objects of religious belief exist independently 
of what we take to be our human experience of them’. See: John Hick, An Interpretation of 
Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989), p. 172.
9 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p. 141.
10 Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, p. 140.
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him in a kind of objectifying knowledge that inevitably annihilates his 
divinity. In particular, Soskice does not seem to realize that the way in 
which e.g. physics uses the metaphor of the Big Bang in order to describe 
the origin of the universe differs completely from the metaphorical way 
in which Christians call God the creator of the world. I fully agree with 
her that metaphors play an essential role both in science and in religion, 
but there is a  gulf that separates scientific metaphors from religious 
ones. The above example shows that not only is the relation between 
religious language and the reality it refers to a  metaphorical one, but 
also the relation between religious and scientific language. Whereas 
Soskice deserves full credit for having clarified the former, she fails to 
give account of the latter.
2.1 The critique of onto-theology
As is common knowledge, the problems of a representing knowledge of 
God’s reality and of putting religion and theology on the same line as science 
were first developed by Heidegger in the context of his deconstruction 
of metaphysics as ontotheology. It has had such an  influence among 
continental philosophers that a  whole generation considered any 
philosophical reflection on God’s existence as contradictory. As I  will 
show in the next subsection, three contemporary French philosophers, 
Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jean-Luc Marion, have taken 
Heidegger’s critique to heart, but without considering it as the final 
judgment against thinking about God’s reality philosophically. On the 
contrary, Heidegger has inspired them to develop alternative approaches, 
which present relevant alternatives to theological realism’s representing 
knowledge of God.11
For Heidegger, the ontotheological nature of metaphysics has come to 
the fore since modernity, in particular from the moment that Being was 
reduced to an object of representing reasoning, human subjectivity was 
posited as the unique point of reference for all truth and value, and truth 
was defined in terms of objective certainty. This dramatic change in the 
history of Western culture has resulted in the rise of modern science, but 
it has also had an enormous impact on most philosophical approaches of 
God’s existence. A closer look at modern philosophy and science shows 
11 I developed this issue in more detail in Peter Jonkers, ‘God in France: Heidegger’s 
Legacy’, in Peter Jonkers, Ruud Welten (eds.), God in France: Eight Contemporary French 
Thinkers on God (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), pp. 1-42.
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that the two are closely linked together: science accepts the philosophical 
idea of God as the ultimate foundation of nature, and philosophy accepts 
the kind of foundational knowledge that science offers as its paradigm. 
A clear example of this is link the concept of (sufficient) ground: Being 
is understood as ground, while thinking gathers itself towards Being 
as its ground in the manner of giving ground and accounting for the 
ground.12 This ground is the ultimate principle, on the basis of which 
science and philosophy can represent the whole of reality as something 
radically coherent and transparent. From a  philosophical perspective, 
only God qualifies for being this absolute ground and, consequently, 
modern philosophy attributes a  central position to Him. Concretely, 
Heidegger thinks of Descartes’ idea of the infinite, Leibniz’s principle 
of sufficient ground, Spinoza’s absolute substance, and Hegel’s absolute 
idea. Theological realism could be added to this list, because it is 
governed by the same ideal of foundational and representing knowledge 
as modern science.
In the work of Ricoeur, the theme of the deconstruction of onto-
theology plays a major role in his struggle with the tradition of reflective 
philosophy. Its discourse is characterized by universality, univocity, 
and unity and, as such, it is opposed to the plurality, equivocity, and 
particularity of the myths. With regard to the thinking of God, reflective 
philosophy proves that it is unable to think the essence of what faith is 
all about, the Wholly Other who addresses and questions us. This kind 
of philosophy is situated on the level of immanence and, therefore, it 
cannot say anything about vertical transcendence. According to Ricoeur, 
the ideal of foundationalism, on which reflective philosophy ultimately 
rests, is a manifestation of its hubris. Instead, philosophy should start 
from the plurality of individual myths and symbols, and reveal the 
universal and rational structure which is hidden in all religions. The 
consequence of this approach is not only an  enlargement, but also 
a qualitative change of reflective consciousness. More specifically, it puts 
autonomous thinking and its ideal of complete reflexivity, transparency, 
and foundationalism under pressure. Ricoeur’s argument ends in 
a rehabilitation of non-speculative language, a way of thinking without 
the totalizing and foundational pretensions of traditional metaphysics.13
12 Martin Heidegger, ‘Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik’, in Martin 
Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 31-67 (p. 48).
13 For an excellent analysis of this aspect of Ricoeur’s work, see: Theo de Boer, ‘Paul 
Ricoeur: Thinking the Bible’, in Peter Jonkers, Ruud Welten (eds.), God in France, pp. 43-67.
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The critique of a  thinking that aims at depicting and representing 
reality is also the point of departure in Lévinas’s philosophical project. 
It aims at thinking of a God who does not coincide with the (supreme) 
being, but is precisely otherwise than Being. In one way or another 
ontotheology annihilates God’s incomprehensible infinity by fitting 
him into a  totalizing system. As a  consequence, God’s transcendence 
is overpowered and the infinite difference between man and God is 
ignored. By conceiving God within the network of Being, ontotheology 
also creates the impression of being able to thematize God and reduce 
Him to an  object of re-presenting thinking.14 Moreover, the subject 
appears in this context as the unique starting point of all initiative in the 
world; as such, the subject is convinced that it can never be disturbed, 
thrown off its balance, or displaced by the intrusion of the infinite. 
Hence, ‘it is no coincidence that the history of western philosophy 
has resulted in an  annihilation of transcendence.’15 Lévinas thereby 
explicitly includes rational theology, and hence theological realism, and 
this in spite of its attempts to do justice to the idea of transcendence 
by qualifying God’s existence with adverbs such as ‘eminently’ or ‘par 
excellence’. In sum, Lévinas radically rejects all thinking that tries to 
represent or depict him, and this includes theological realism. Instead, 
the core of his philosophical project is ‘to hear a God not contaminated 
by Being’.16
Marion’s critique of ontotheology is influenced by that of Heidegger 
and Lévinas, as already becomes apparent from the startling title of his 
book God Without Being (Dieu sans l’être).17 He uses the twin concepts 
idol and icon to clarify and balance this issue. Idol refers to a human 
experience of the holy; it is a representation of the holy as seen only from 
a human point of view. A representation fixates, and the idol is precisely 
the point where the movement of fluid thinking stops and fixates itself. As 
far as philosophical theology is concerned, this attitude refers to a way of 
thinking about God in terms of representing and depicting his reality. As 
a representation, God is no longer infinite, but is being fixated within the 
boundaries of the human capacity of representing, and more specifically 
within those of the correspondence theory. Therefore, in order to avoid 
14 Emmanuel Lévinas, De Dieu qui vient à l’idée (Paris: Vrin, 1986), p. 100.
15 Emmanuel Lévinas, De Dieu qui vient à l’idée, p. 95.
16 Emmanuel Lévinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1978), p. X.
17 Jean-Luc Marion, Dieu sans l’être (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991).
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conceptual idolatry one has to think about God outside the purview of 
metaphysics, and, in particular, outside that of theological realism.
2.2. Thinking of God as radically transcendent
It seems clear to me that these comments from the perspective of 
contemporary continental, in particular French philosophy are very 
relevant for the debate about theological realism. Ricoeur´s critique that 
natural theology fails to take into account the plurality and particularity 
of the Christian narrative about God’s nature and existence does not 
turn him into an  advocate of the anti-realist position. It rather shows 
him as someone who has taken Pascal’s adage of the rift between the 
God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob to 
heart and has introduced it in the current debate. Through his project 
of a non-speculative philosophy of religion, Ricoeur tries, on the basis 
of a hermeneutical analysis of the meaning of the Christian narrative, 
to discover its universal significance. In this respect, his position comes 
close to that of internal realism, which, just like Ricoeur, takes the 
plurality of religious languages as its point of departure, and situates the 
ontological claims of theological realism within these languages, thereby 
rejecting the rationalistic foundationalism that characterizes theological 
realism.18 However, an important difference between these two positions 
is that internal realism leads to the conclusion that the affirmation of 
God’s reality only makes sense within Christian dogmatics,19 whereas 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic approach tries to move beyond the confines of the 
various religions, which enables him to affirm God’s reality on a general, 
philosophical level.
Lévinas’s and Marion’s critique of the key concept of theological 
realism, namely representation or depiction leads them to affirm God as 
the radical Other, who disrupts all thinking in terms of correspondence 
and analogy. Lévinas wants to conceive a new, absolute notion of sense 
which cannot but lie radically at the other side of Being and which we 
can only trace through ethics as the unconditional appeal of the radically 
Other to me. With regard to the overcoming of ontotheology, Lévinas 
fundamentally differs from Heidegger: if philosophy takes God for Being, 
this inevitably implies that Being becomes the ultimate source of sense. 
18 Hans-Peter Großhans, Theologischer Realismus, pp. 266f.
19 Hans-Peter Großhans, Theologischer Realismus, p. 267.
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This shuts the door to a radically transcendent sense, that is to say, a sense 
intruding into earthly Being from outside or above, a sense that does not 
find its origin in the order of ‘sameness’ but in the incommensurable 
Other.20 Lévinas’s thinking aims at showing that an  authentic sense-
giving thinking, i.e., thinking that looks for a primordial, absolute sense, 
necessarily implies the explosion or the subversion of Being, since Being 
itself and the sense of Being only manifest themselves as a contingent 
history of beings and a heterogeneous multiplicity of senses.
Lévinas’s notion ‘God as otherwise than being’ and, even more 
radically, Marion’s provocative expression ‘God without being’ are not 
at all intended to query, let alone to negate the reality of God’s existence, 
and hence are anything but a plea for theological anti-realism. Instead, 
they are the upshot of their phenomenological investigation of the way 
in which God ‘comes to mind’. This implies a  total passivity from the 
part of the subject, which can be compared to a trauma, inflicted by the 
idea of the infinite.21 Although stemming from a different philosophical 
tradition, these remarks can only be interpreted as a fundamental critique 
of theological realism’s approach of examining how the human mind 
can represent or depict God’s reality. Phrased positively, these notions 
are meant to make us sensitive of the excessiveness of God’s existence, 
radically exceeding the boundaries of (earthly) being.
III. GOD AS A POSTULATE OF REASON
My second comment on theological realism relates to the title of this paper, 
‘Living as if God exists’. At first sight, this title seems to cast an agnostic 
doubt on theological realism. Indeed, it leaves the metaphysical question 
about the ontological status of a  transcendent divine reality as well as 
the epistemological question whether humans can affirm God’s existence 
on objective grounds open. But, as I  will show below in more detail, 
the expression ‘living as if God exists’ also encourages people to accept 
God’s existence not so much on objective, but on practical grounds. 
Moreover, by encouraging all people to live as if God exists, irrespective 
of whether they are (Christian) believers or not, this expression aims to 
offer a transcendent common ground for our life-practices in times of 
radical pluralism.
20 Emmanuel Lévinas, Dieu, la mort et le temps (Paris: Grasset, 1993), p. 141.
21 Emmanuel Lévinas, De Dieu qui vient à l’idée, p. 106.
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In the history of philosophy, this position goes back to Kant, more 
specifically to his approach of God as a  regulative idea of theoretical 
reason and as a postulate of practical reason. For Kant, distinguishing 
between a  constitutive and a  regulative employment of this idea is 
essential for avoiding dialectic semblance. A  constitutive employment 
of the idea of God is erroneous, because it takes God as an  object of 
theoretical knowledge, thus putting Him on a  par with the objects 
of possible sensory experience.22 But a  regulative use of this idea is 
indispensible in order to orientate our theoretical thinking towards 
the greatest possible unity and opens up the way for postulating God’s 
existence on a practical level. I will examine if and how this distinction 
and its implications on the level of practical philosophy shed a new light 
on theological realism.
As a sort of captatio benevolentiae for my approach, I want to note 
that one of the proponents of critical theological realism, John Hick, also 
makes use of Kant’s philosophy in his investigation into the sensibility of 
affirming God’s existence in a situation of religious pluralism. According 
to Hick, all world religions are valid renderings of the Ultimate Reality. 
His approach can be qualified as a  realist one, because, ultimately, 
reality confers truth on religious propositions. Basic to Hick’s critical 
theological realism is an  interpretation of Kant’s distinction between 
the phenomenal and the noumenal order, between reality as it appears 
to us and reality as it is in itself (the Real), and the contention that we 
always experience reality mediated through our preconceptions.23 
Critical theological realism admits that we are unable to experience 
or know the Real, but we do have good reasons to affirm its existence, 
because it appears to us through our concepts, language etc. In other 
words, critical theological realism rests on the conviction that humans 
give a  cognitive, conceptually mediated and hence culturally situated 
response to a transcendent reality. We can never experience or know the 
Real as such, but it cannot be qualified as a purely imaginative projection 
either. Instead, ‘the noumenal Real is experienced and thought by 
different religious traditions, as the range of gods and absolutes which 
the phenomenology of religion reports. And these divine personae and 
22 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, in Immanuel Kant, Werke in zehn 
Bänden, Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel, Band 4: Kritik der reinen Vernunft: 
Zweiter Teil (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), pp.  B 670-680. All 
references to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason are taken from the second edition (=B) of 1787.
23 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 241.
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metaphysical impersonae [...] are not illusory but are empirically, that is 
experientially, real as authentic manifestations of the Real.’24 In partial 
agreement, but also partial disagreement with Kant, Hick says that the 
Real an sich is postulated by us as a pre-supposition, not of the moral 
life, as it is for Kant, but of religious experience and the religious life. So, 
humans experience the Real, but only through their categorical schemes, 
thanks to which the Real becomes a meaningful phenomenal experience, 
to which they can respond in a  cognitive way. The only thing we can 
say about the Real is that it is the reality whose influence produces, 
in collaboration with the human mind, the phenomenal world of our 
(religious) experience and the linguistic interpretations of it. Another 
important difference with Kant’s philosophy is that, whereas the Kantian 
categories are universal and invariable because of their strictly formal 
nature, Hick’s religious categorical schemes are culture-relative, thus 
being responsible for the wide variety of existing religions.25
Another recent example of someone who re-employs Kant’s philosophy 
in a similar way as Hick is no one less than Joseph Ratzinger. It has to be 
noted first of all that Ratzinger is very critical of Hick’s above-mentioned 
distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal as a means to save 
theological realism in a situation of religious pluralism; he disqualifies 
this attempt as plainly relativistic, because it allows the Absolute only to 
exist in the form of historically and culturally situated models, whereas 
the Absolute as such cannot exist in history.26 But notwithstanding 
his critique of the relativistic (at least, in his view)27 conclusions Hick 
24 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 242.
25 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, pp. 243f.
26 Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), pp. 120f. The chapter of this book in which he discusses 
Hick’s views iwas presented as a paper on a conference in Mexico in 1996. See Joseph 
Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, p. 113.
27 Ratzinger considers relativism (together with the predominance of scientific reason, 
which is fixated in its opposition to faith) as the most important threat of our times. 
Unfortunately, he is so much preoccupied by this problem that he fails to appreciate 
the urgent need of a serious investigation into the problem of (religious) pluralism, and 
does not seem to see that pluralism cannot be identified with relativism just like that. 
This prevents him, in my view, from an unbiased examination of Hick’s ideas on this 
issue (see Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, pp. 119-122). For Hick’s reaction, in 
which he points to the unfairness of Ratzinger’s critique see: John Hick, Dialogues in the 
Philosophy of Religion (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), pp. 157-160. However, 
in his later work (his critique of Hick’s views on religious pluralism stems from 1996), 
Ratzinger seems to have taken a somewhat more open position with regard to (religious) 
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draws from Kant’s theoretical philosophy, Ratzinger appreciates 
Kant’s practical philosophy much more. In his book Christianity and 
the Crisis of Cultures, Ratzinger boldly suggests that a  secular person, 
‘who does not succeed in finding the path to accepting the existence of 
God ought nevertheless try to live and to direct his life veluti si Deus 
daretur, as if God did indeed exist’.28 The reason for Ratzinger to make 
such an exhortation, thereby referring to Kant’s postulates of practical 
reason and Pascal’s wager, is that it enables him to solve the problem of 
the ultimate foundation of moral normativity in contemporary, pluralist 
society. The idea of God refers to a dimension of reality and in particular 
of human life that is more fundamental than the differences in moral 
convictions between religious and secular people and thus precedes 
moral consensus building. In Ratzinger’s view, the exhortation to live 
as if God indeed exists refers to the idea that in all human beings’ ways 
of life there is a common ultimate goal, which transcends the here and 
now. He defines it as the logos that inheres the world, thus showing that 
this goal is not the result of political consensus building, but reversely 
that this consensus is oriented by this goal. This serves for Ratzinger as 
a regulative idea, whose reality has to be postulated in order to serve as 
a point of orientation for a true consensus between believing and secular 
people. But precisely because it is a regulative idea, it is impossible for 
any religion or secular philosophy of life to claim the possession of it; 
hence the ‘as if ’.29
3.1. God as a regulative idea of reason
My critique of the objective version of theological realism, offered by 
Soskice and others, points to the need of an  alternative approach to 
God’s reality. The above references to Hick and Ratzinger indicate that 
pluralism. See e.g. Joseph Ratzinger, ‘That Which Holds the World Together: The Pre-
Political Moral Foundations of a Free State’, in Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, 
The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2006), 
pp. 53-80 (p.79).
28 Joseph Ratzinger, Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press), 2006, p. 51.
29 For a  more extensive discussion of Ratzinger’s position on this issue see Peter 
Jonkers, ‘A  Purifying Force for Reason? Pope Benedict on the Role of Christianity in 
Advanced Modernity’, in Staf Hellemans and Joseph Wissink (eds.), Towards a  New 
Catholic Church in Advanced Modernity: Transformations, Visions, Tensions (Tilburg 
Theological Studies 5) (Münster: Lit, 2012), pp. 79-102.
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this kind of alternative I suggest is of a practical or life orienting nature. 
The shift that I suggest can be summarized by Kant’s famous quote: ‘I had 
to supersede knowledge in order to make room for faith.’30 Contrary to 
some interpretations, this quote is anything but supporting the popular 
dichotomy between an unfaithful reason and an unreasonable faith. It 
rather shows that philosophy should, after having recognized that a kind 
of scientific knowledge that aims at representing or depicting the divine 
reality does not lead us to an understanding of God’s reality. Instead, we 
should approximate him as the object of a reasonable faith, i.e. a faith that 
is not based on a particular religious revelation, but on universal reason, 
and hence has to be studied philosophically. Furthermore, this faith does 
not affirm God’s existence on objective, but rather on subjective grounds, 
as a regulative idea. Finally, God’s reality is a symbolic one, which links 
him to the cultural world instead of the natural one. In particular, God 
appears for Kant as the ultimate point of orientation of our lives. In 
this and the next section, I will explore Kant’s complex insight further, 
focusing on its relevance for theological realism.
The practical approach that I  propose and try to develop in this 
section is not intended to disqualify a theoretical investigation into the 
nature and characteristics of God’s reality. On the contrary, the history 
of philosophical theology shows that it makes perfect sense to examine 
theoretically how to understand the articles of faith, e.g. that God is the 
creator of heaven and earth, that He is related to the world in a unique 
way, that He is a spiritual being, etc. But, in my view, these vital questions 
of theological realism only become relevant once one has accepted 
to put one’s life in the sign of the risen Lord; that is, from a  religious 
point of view. In other words, theological realism is unable to provide 
a common ground on the basis of which one can discuss what it means 
to believe in God. To my mind, a practical approach, which starts from 
a philosophical investigation into what it means to live as if God exists, is 
better suited to discuss religious issues in a pluralistic society, because it 
can be brought into dialogue with other, secular ways of life.
Let us start with exploring the Kantian background of Hick’s distinction 
between the phenomenal and the noumenal and his postulating of the 
Real an sich as well as Ratzinger’s suggestion to a secular person to live 
as if God indeed exists. For Kant, the idea of God, which belongs to the 
noumenal sphere, has an ‘excellent, and indeed indispensably necessary 
30 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B XXX.
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regulative employment’.31 The function of this idea is that of ‘directing 
the understanding towards a certain goal upon which the routes marked 
out by all its rules converge, as upon their point of intersection.’32 The 
aim of reason is to connect the plurality, which characterizes the body of 
our knowledge, in conformity with a single, unifying principle, in order 
to turn this contingent aggregate of knowledge into a systematic whole. 
This unity of reason does not result from an abstraction of the plurality 
of our insights, but this plurality reversely presupposes a preceding idea 
of systematic wholeness, on the basis of which the place of these plural 
insights in the whole and their mutual relations can be determined. This 
idea not only orientates us in all our enquiries of nature, but also – as 
the highest good – in our moral actions.33 As we shall see below, it is 
especially the moral or practical aspect of this orientating idea that is 
relevant in the context of this paper. On the level of theoretical reason, it 
is obvious that God cannot be an object of our actual knowledge, but can 
only be thought as an  idea that contains no contradictions. Therefore, 
theoretical reason can only admit this idea in a  problematic way. The 
term ‘problematic’ has a very specific meaning in this context: it does 
not mean that it makes no sense to think about God, but rather that the 
idea of God is assigned to us as a task for philosophical reflection, with 
the intention of bringing ‘unity into the body of our detailed knowledge, 
and thereby to approximate the rule of universality’.34
What seems to me very relevant in Kant’s ideas on this issue is first of 
all the idea that a philosophical reflection on God, including theological 
realism, should not focus on objective propositions about God’s reality, 
but show that accepting the reality of God is necessary on subjective 
grounds. The term ‘subjective’ does not mean that such a  reflection 
is inevitably biased in a  religious way, nor that it is nothing but the 
expression of a private whim, but refers to a need of practical reason to 
make the highest good to the object of my will.35 In other words, the idea 
31 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B 672.
32 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B 672.
33 See: Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, in Immanuel Kant, Werke 
in zehn Bänden, Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel, Band 6: Schriften zur Ethik 
und Religionsphilosophie, p.  256, and Immanuel Kant, ‘Was heißt: sich im Denken 
orientieren?’, in Immanuel Kant, Werke in zehn Bänden, Herausgegeben von Wilhelm 
Weischedel, Band 5: Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, pp. 271-274.
34 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B 675; see also pp. B 691 and B 697.
35 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, pp. 256, 276.
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of God is necessary for a human’s never ending task to give meaning to the 
world in which he lives. So the suggestion to think of God as a regulative 
idea of reason is meant to move philosophical thinking away from all 
kinds of theoretical considerations about God’s nature and attributes, 
and direct it towards a reflection on the idea of God as an indispensible 
life-orienting principle.
Although Hick builds on Kant’s conception of God as noumenal, 
he does not follow Kant in his switch from an  objective, theoretical 
approach of God to a subjective, practical one. The consequence of this is 
that Hick, just like Soskice, ends up with a rather objectivistic approach 
of God (or of the ‘Real’, as he calls it), which fails to do justice to the 
committed, practical way in which all people, regardless whether they 
are Christian or not, orient themselves in their lives to God. For Hick, 
‘the Real is experienced by human beings [...] in a  manner analogous 
to that in which [...] we experience the world: namely by informational 
input from external reality being interpreted by the mind in terms of its 
own categorical scheme and thus coming to consciousness as meaningful 
phenomenal experience.’ The Real, then, ‘is the reality whose influence 
produces, in collaboration with the human mind, the phenomenal world 
of our experience’.36 This shows that, for Hick, the Real serves as the 
ground of our experience of the world in a similarly neutral, objective 
way as science argues that gravity is the ground of mass. But this neutral, 
objective observation about such a ground differs fundamentally from 
the committed way in which religious people experience God as the 
ground of their lives, which is precisely the point that Kant tries to make 
when he calls the idea of God a regulative idea of reason. In sum, Hick 
tries to combine an objective and a subjective approach, a theoretical and 
a practical one, a neutral and a committed one, but fails to notice the 
fundamental rift that separates these two domains of reality, as well as 
the fact that, in religious matters, the latter approach predominates.
What this practical, life-orienting approach to God concretely means 
becomes apparent when we make a short detour and further examine 
Ratzinger’s puzzling exhortation to secular people to ‘live as if God 
exists’. He is obviously intrigued by the universality that Kant’s regulative 
use of the idea of God implies, and applies it to the problem of a moral 
and political normativity in a  radically pluralist world. Contemporary 
democratic society is confronted with the problem that, because every 
36 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.
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kind of normativity should be the result of political consensus only, it 
runs the risk that a coincidental majority can impose its views, which 
eventually may prove to be unjust. In Ratzinger’s view, this problem is 
symptomatic for a pluralistic society that by definition lacks a common 
moral point of orientation that transcends the here and now.37 The very 
reality of societal pluralism shows that the idea of such a  moral and 
political normativity is not actually ‘available’ as an  object of moral 
knowing, but it is nevertheless ‘subjectively’ needed for the sake of justice. 
In Ratzinger’s eyes, Kant’s proposal to approach God as a  universal 
regulative idea in order to orientate the plurality of human thinking 
towards an original idea of systematic and dynamic unity is very useful 
to offer a solution to this problem. Because of its transcendent character, 
the idea of a moral and political normativity is inevitably a regulative one, 
which means that it cannot be given objectively, but only problematically. 
It is the asymptotic point, to which the existing moral plurality endlessly 
approximates without ever being able to reach it. But at the same time 
it is far more than a neutral hypothesis that may be introduced in order 
to solve a theoretical problem. Instead, it is indispensible for all people, 
religious and secular, since it fulfils their (subjective) need to orient their 
lives towards such a unifying point, so that it can serve as a common 
ground in times of radical pluralism. Hans Joas has made a suggestion in 
this respect that deserves to be further examined: he proposes the idea of 
human dignity as a universal principle that orients the existing plurality 
of moral and political norms and thus serves as a guiding principle for 
a just consensus building.38 When we apply this to Ratzinger’s suggestion 
of living as if God exists, it means that all people, religious and secular, 
should be prepared to let their lives be oriented by such a  normative 
principle. Precisely because it is not actually given as an object of (moral) 
knowledge, this principle is left open to diverse interpretations, religious 
and secular ones, and hence can serve as a common ground in times of 
radical pluralism.
Kant’s account of the indispensable regulative function of the idea 
of God helps me to comment on another important aspect of critical 
37 I  have shown elsewhere that prominent secular political philosophers, such as 
Habermas and Rawls, also take this as a crucial problem for liberal societies. See: Peter 
Jonkers, ‘A  Purifying Force for Reason? Pope Benedict on the Role of Christianity in 
Advanced Modernity’, pp. 92-96.
38 Hans Joas, Die Sakralität der menschlichen Person: Eine neue Genealogie der 
Menschenrechte (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011), p. 303.
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theological realism, which also plays a  predominant role in Hick’s 
philosophy of religion. According to Hick, our cultural situatedness 
implies that all the world religions are different or even conflicting 
renderings of the same ultimate reality, while none of them can 
legitimately claim to be the one and only true rendering of this reality.39 
He uses the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal order of 
religious diversity and the noumenal order of the one ultimate reality to 
underpin his view philosophically. By accepting the reality of religious 
pluralism and showing that all world-religions are renderings of the 
Real, Hick is able to give a solution to the intricate problem of religious 
exclusivism. However, in my opinion, Kant’s distinction has another 
important consequence for religious pluralism, which seems to have 
escaped Hick’s attention. In Kant’s view, the noumenal, in particular 
the idea of the Real an  sich, not only fundamentally differs from the 
phenomenal variety of religions, but also serves as a regulative idea for 
phenomenal reality. Again, Hick accepts the first insight, but refuses the 
second. He considers the Real an sich as so fundamentally different from 
its appearance in mundane reality that the former cannot be qualified in 
any way by human thinking. The Real an sich ‘cannot be said to be one 
or many, person or thing, substance or process, good or evil, purposive 
or non-purposive’.40 We only can make certain purely formal statements 
about the Real in itself, such as Anselm’s definition of God as that than 
which no greater can be conceived.41
The above not only implies that we are unable to qualify the Real 
an sich in any substantial way, but also, reversely, that the Real cannot 
serve as a  reference point to distinguish between authentic and 
inauthentic manifestations of it. On the other hand, Hick also recognizes 
‘that not all religious persons, practices and beliefs are of equal value’,42 
and develops criteria to make such distinctions on rational grounds. 
He thereby comes to the conclusion that ‘religious traditions and their 
various components – beliefs, modes of experience, scriptures, rituals, 
disciplines, ethics and lifestyles, social rules and organizations  – have 
greater or less value according as they promote or hinder the salvific 
transformation’.43 But these criteria are only internal, i.e. they only 
39 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 243.
40 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 246.
41 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 246.
42 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 299.
43 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, p. 300.
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concern the phenomenal variety of religions, but have no relation to the 
Real an sich, which is radically external with regard to the phenomenal 
plurality of religions. In my view, Hick’s position is quite problematic in 
this respect, because one cannot, on the basis of purely internal criteria, 
determine why a religion should be salvific at all, or why the spiritual 
and moral fruits of one religious tradition are more salvific than those 
over another one. On a more fundamental level, Hick’s position yields to 
non-realism: if the Real an sich does not qualify the phenomenal (variety 
of religions) in any way, one can legitimately ask whether we could not 
as well drop it altogether. 
By contrast, Kant’s suggestion about the regulative function of the 
noumenal with regard to the phenomenal order offers a  far better 
solution to this problem. When applied to philosophy of religion, the 
regulative idea of reason does not provide an  unequivocal positive 
criterion to determine which religion is the one and only true one, but 
it does offer a crucial negative criterion to criticize (aspects of) religions 
that run counter to this idea, because they fail to include certain crucial 
aspects of salvation. Moreover, because of its noumenal character, 
this regulative idea is external with regard to the phenomenal variety 
of religions, and hence is able to offer a  stronger kind of normativity 
than the internal criteria that are developed by the various religions. 
In my view, Kant’s suggestion does more justice to the essential critical 
dimension of philosophy of religion with regard to all the existing 
religions than Hick’s position.44
3.2. Is the idea of God nothing but a heuristic fiction?
However, the crucial question that has not yet been answered is how 
the indispensible regulative employment of the idea of God relates to 
theological realism’s most fundamental claim, namely God’s existence 
as an  independent reality. Let us first again explore Kant’s position on 
this problem a  bit further. The excellent and indispensible regulative 
44 Kant points out the critical function of transcendental theology, to which theological 
realism belongs, quite clearly. Foreshadowing the affirmation of God’s existence 
as a  postulate of practical reason he states: ‘For if, [...] perhaps on practical grounds, 
the presupposition of a  supreme and self-sufficient being, as the highest intelligence, 
established its validity beyond all question, it would be of the greatest importance [...] to 
free it from whatever [...] is out of keeping with the supreme reality, and at the same time 
to dispose of all counter-assertions, whether atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic.’ See 
Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B 668.
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employment of the idea of reason does not mean that this idea would 
be more for theoretical reason than a  focus imaginarius, or a heuristic 
fiction.45 This means that it has no objective reality and thus cannot 
become an  object of scientific knowledge. In order to clarify things 
somewhat Kant compares the idea of reason with the image in a mirror of 
an object behind us. Because what we see in the mirror is only a reduced 
image of the ‘real’ object, it lacks essential aspects of objectivity (it has 
no depth, cannot be touched, heard or smelled). Hence, this image is not 
an object of our knowledge in the strict sense, so that its ontological and 
epistemological status can never be more than that of a heuristic fiction. 
It is obvious that, in this theoretical respect, calling God a  heuristic 
fiction runs counter to theological realism’s affirmation of God’s objective 
existence. But Kant also states that this image is indispensible in order 
find out (the Greek word heuristein literally means to find out) what 
is happening behind our back; in other words, although this image is 
a heuristic fiction on a theoretical level, it is nevertheless indispensible 
in a practical sense, namely for our orientation, e.g. when we drive a car. 
Hence, counter to theological realism’s affirmation of the objective reality 
of God Kant concludes that the best theoretical philosophy can make of 
it is ‘that the things of the world must be viewed as if they received their 
existence from a highest intelligence’.46 The combination of ‘must’ and ‘as 
if ’ shows that God is an objectively problematic idea, while assuming his 
existence is subjectively indispensible.
The above shows that Kant passes a  negative judgment on any 
philosophical affirmation of God’s existence as an objective, independent 
reality, but also that he leaves room for another approach, which he 
qualifies as a  subjective or practical one. He describes the difference 
between these two approaches as follows: ‘[T]heoretical knowledge 
may be defined as knowledge of what is, practical knowledge as the 
representation of what ought to be.’47 Practical knowledge is not limited to 
a set of moral principles, but comprises all conditions that are necessary 
for humans to commit themselves to acting morally. This includes 
God as a  postulate of practical reason. Postulating God on practical 
grounds clearly differs from taking him as a theoretical hypothesis: ‘[T]
he moral laws do not merely presuppose the existence of a  supreme 
45 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, pp. B 672f.; see also p. B 699.
46 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, pp. B 698f.; see also p. B 714.
47 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B 661.
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being [as an optional and contingent hypothesis], but also [...] justify us 
in postulating it, though, indeed, only from a practical point of view.’48 
This means practical reason does not provide us with knowledge of God 
an sich, apart from our conceptual structures, so that we have no idea at 
all of God’s reality, nor how to represent or to depict him. But although 
God is no object of theoretical reason, He is the ultimate object of our 
moral will as (an element of) the highest good. In order to make this 
object possible, His existence has to be postulated by practical reason. 
The postulates ‘do not enlarge speculative knowledge, but (through their 
connection to practical matters) they give an objective reality to the ideas 
of speculative reason.’49
The above analysis makes clear that God is definitely more than 
a heuristic fiction. However, in order to serve as a relevant comment on 
theological realism this ‘more’ needs further qualification. First of all, 
stating that God’s reality is a postulate of practical reason implies that the 
affirmation of His existence cannot result from theoretical considerations, 
such as the correspondence between our religious concepts and 
propositions and supernatural reality, or from an analogy between the 
natural and the supernatural.50 As I argued in the second section of this 
paper, God fundamentally exceeds all worldly categories, so that every 
attempt to affirm his existence on the basis of such a  correspondence 
or analogy inevitably leads to an  imaginative projection, and, hence, 
from a religious perspective, to idolatry. Instead, I propose to think of 
God as a symbolic reality, which defines Him as a spiritual, rather than 
as a  natural reality. More specifically, as the highest good God is the 
ultimate orientation point of our lives as moral beings, and hence is the 
highest, transcendent symbolic reality. This also relates God’s existence 
to the domain of human culture, but without linking him exclusively to 
this or that specific (religious) culture, nor reducing him to a product 
of it. Thinking of God as a  symbolic reality somehow softens the rift 
48 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B 662.
49 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, p. 264.
50 On this point I  do not agree with Brunsveld’s interpretation of Hick’s position. 
Brunsveld links Hick’s postulating of God’s existence with a  correspondence between 
the phenomenal and the noumenal. But Hick considers the Real an sich (the noumenal) 
as so fundamentally different from its appearance in mundane reality that the former 
cannot be qualified in any way by human thinking. This implies that there cannot be 
a correspondence between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. See Niek Brunsveld, 
The Many Faces of Religious Pluralism, p. 44.
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between the phenomenal and the noumenal, not on a theoretical, but on 
a practical level. Furthermore, qualifying God’s symbolic reality as the 
highest good offers a philosophical underpinning the essential salvific 
character of the Real, which Hick refuses to accept.
Finally, the affirmation of God as a symbolic reality, more specifically 
as the highest good, may be seen as an expression of reasonable faith. This 
faith is reasonable and not revealed, because it ‘springs from pure reason 
(according to its theoretical as well as its practical use)’.51 In this respect, 
Kant makes an  important distinction between opining, knowing, and 
believing, which sheds an important light on the epistemological aspect 
of theological realism. Holding something to be true rests, of course, on 
objective grounds (namely on the correspondence of a  judgment with 
an object or state of affairs), but also requires a subjective element, which 
is called a conviction (if the judgment is valid for every reasonable being) 
or a persuasion (if it is a private opinion). As to the subjective aspect 
of the validity of a  judgment, more specifically of a  conviction, Kant 
distinguishes three levels: ‘Opining, believing and knowing. Opining is such 
holding of a judgment as is consciously insufficient, not only objectively, 
but also subjectively. If our holding of the judgment be only subjectively 
sufficient, and is at the same time taken as being objectively insufficient, 
we have that what is termed believing. Lastly, when the holding of a thing 
to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is knowledge.’52 
As far as we are striving for the enlargement of our theoretical 
knowledge, we are not permitted to hold the judgment that God really 
exists to be true, because there is no object or state of affairs to which 
such a  judgment corresponds; in other words, the judgment that God 
really exists, as theological realism claims, lacks the objective sufficiency 
that is needed for all theoretical knowledge. But from a practical point 
of view it very well makes sense to believe or have faith in the truth of 
a  judgment that is insufficient to hold true from a theoretical point of 
view. This is especially the case when practical reason requires a point 
of orientation for our moral life, while lacking objective certainty about 
it. Hence, it makes perfect sense to have a reasonable faith (as opposed 
to a revealed one) in God, which allows us to hold the judgment that 
God exists to be true on sufficient subjective grounds, although we are 
51 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der praktischen Vernunft’, p. 257.
52 Immanuel Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, p. B 850. It has to be noted that the 
German word ‘Glaube’ can be translated both by ‘belief ’ and ‘faith’.
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fully aware that we lack the objective sufficiency that would make this 
judgment to a certainty for theoretical knowledge.
CONCLUSION
With this paper I  hope to have shown that theological realism’s 
predominantly theoretical approach to God’s reality is problematic, 
basically because it rests on the epistemological presupposition of being 
able to represent or depict the divine reality in a way that is similar to 
science. Instead, I  suggest to approach God’s reality from a  practical 
perspective, as an indispensible regulative idea for our orientation in life. 
This does not reduce God to a heuristic fiction, but affirms his reality on 
a symbolic level, as a postulate of practical reason.
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